Quantifying the Personal Income Tax Benefits of Backdating: A Canada - US Comparison by Compton, Ryan et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Quantifying the Personal Income Tax
Benefits of Backdating: A Canada - US
Comparison
Compton, Ryan and Nicholls, Christopher C. and Sandler,
Daniel and Tedds, Lindsay
University of Victoria, University of Manitoba, Western University
2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39789/
MPRA Paper No. 39789, posted 12 Nov 2019 14:45 UTC
   
QUANTIFYING THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
BENEFITS OF BACKDATING: A CANADA – US 
COMPARISON 
Ryan A. Compton∗ 
Christopher C. Nicholls** 
Daniel Sandler*** 
Lindsay M. Tedds**** 
 
Abstract 
This paper contrasts the post-tax returns of backdated at-the-money options to 
currently-dated in-the-money options (with the same strike price as the backdated 
options) and demonstrates that a Canadian executive can earn a significantly larger 
after-tax return from backdated options compared to a US executive.  We tie this to the 
favorable Canadian tax treatment of executive options relative to their treatment in the 
United States.  The comparison suggests that the personal tax regime may have been one 
of the factors which impacted the desire to receive backdated options in lieu of other 
forms of compensation in Canada but not so in the United States. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of backdating executive stock options has received significant 
attention in the U.S. financial 1  and legal 2  literature, and has recently begun to be 
discussed in the Canadian legal literature.3  Backdating, in its most basic form, is the use 
of hindsight to selectively pick a local low point in a stock’s trading price and issue 
executive stock options stipulating the selected date as the grant date when, in fact, the 
options are granted at a later date.  Because the backdated options’ strike price is lower 
than the market price on the actual grant date, the recipient has received something of 
greater monetary value (even if the options have not yet vested) than a correctly dated at-
the-money option.4  
Companies could reward executives with cash compensation or additional 
properly dated and priced incentive awards, including options, rather than engage in 
dubious backdating practices.5  It is clear that there must be reasons other than greed that 
have led so many to backdate executive options. 6   Academics, regulators, and 
                                                   
1
 See generally Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top 
Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513 (2009) (estimating “that 13.6% of all 
option grants to top executives during the period 1996-2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated.”); 
Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005) (discussing how corporate 
executives are becoming more adroit at timing stock option awards to their advantage); M. P. Narayanan & 
H. Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase Their 
Compensation?, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 1907 (2008) (discussing the phenomenon of managers backdating or 
forward-dating stock options to maximize profitability depending on whether the stock price is rising or 
falling). 
2
 See generally ; M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact of 
Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597 (2007) (discussing the value loss to 
shareholders of companies involved in backdating); David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic 
Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.C. L. REV. 561 (2007) (discussing the 
economics of backdating and the attributes of companies under investigation). 
3
 See generally Ryan A. Compton, Daniel Sandler & Lindsay M. Tedds, Options Backdating: A 
Canadian Perspective, 47 CAN. BUS. L. J. 363 (2009) (analyzing the practice and prevalence of backdating in 
Canada and the legal, tax, and policy implications of the practice). 
4
 The terms at-the-money, out-of-the-money, in-the-money, and not-in-the-money refer to when the 
exercise price of the option equals, exceeds, is below, and is at or above the market price of the underlying 
stock. 
5
 See Compton et al., supra note 3, at 370-71 (discussing backdating in the U.S. and Canada in 
detail).  In summary, backdating is permitted in the U.S. if no documents are falsified, shareholders are duly 
notified, the company’s earnings and tax statements properly account for the backdating, and since 2004, 
both the individual and the company adhere to I.R.C. § 409A.  See I.R.C. § 409A (2006).  In reality, these 
conditions have seldom been met.  In Canada, companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) may 
not backdate at all, as the exchange requires all option awards of listed companies to be granted not-in-the-
money.  See infra note 9.  Companies listed on the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V) may grant in-the-money 
options but may not backdate under any conditions. 
6
 Similarly, the manipulation of stock options in the past may today encourage the use of a different 
incentive award, such as a restricted stock unit.  A restricted stock unit is an unsecured promise to grant a set 
number of shares according to a vesting schedule, but only if forfeiture requirements, such as termination of 
employment or failing to meet performance goals, have not been triggered.  See Mark P. Cussen, How 
Restricted Stock and RSUs are Taxed, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 10, 2012, 1:48 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/tax/09/restricted-stock-tax.asp (providing a more expansive definition).  
More research is required to identify whether other forms of incentive-based awards are indeed being 
manipulated.  In addition, other pricing behavior may have supplanted backdating.  For instance, Betty Wu 
finds that the incidence of option repricing has increased in the United States and that repricing seems to be 
associated with advantageous and temporary changes in a company’s stock price.  Betty Wu, Is CEO Stock 
Option Backdating or Otherwise Manipulation Another Form of Option Repricing? 12 (Social Science 
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practitioners alike have tried to gain a better understanding of these incentives and the 
roles they have played in the backdating scandal; however, there is as of yet no consensus 
regarding the causes of backdating.7  This is problematic because policy, legislative, or 
regulatory changes are unlikely to be effective if the root causes are unknown. 
Untangling the causes of backdating will remain elusive unless each factor is considered 
in detail using evidence from different regimes. 
The first step in untangling the causes of backdating8 is to acknowledge that the 
backdating phenomenon must be driven by both supply and demand factors.  From the 
supply side, the question is what motivates a firm to grant a backdated option, and from 
the demand side, what motivates an executive to demand (or, at the very least, accept) a 
backdated option?  Both sets of motivations arise from the quantitative and qualitative 
benefits, costs, and risks of issuing and receiving backdated options.  Most of the 
research to date has focused on supply side factors (e.g. accounting treatment, securities 
regulations, and corporate taxation),9 while there has been little discussion of demand 
                                                                                                                                           
Research Network, Working Paper, 2012).  Based on this evidence, Wu postulates that option repricing may 
have replaced backdating at some firms.  See id. at 23. 
7
 In addition, there is a paucity of empirical evidence about the incidence of backdating by 
Canadian firms.  See infra note 21. 
8
 Some observers, including the SEC, have concluded that backdating is a thing of the past due to 
increased corporate governance, higher perceived enforcement, and tightened reporting requirements.  
However, this conclusion appears to be premature since there is evidence which shows that backdating, while 
restricted, is still ongoing.  In her empirical study, Wu demonstrates that option backdating is not associated 
with weak corporate governance, thereby questioning the influence of corporate governance provisions in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) on backdating activities.  Wu, supra note 6, at 5-6.  Other scholars 
question the effectiveness of enforcement in curbing backdating since only about 140 companies in the 
United States are under federal investigation, yet empirical research indicates that the number of companies 
that have backdated options are in the thousands.  See James Bickley & Gary Shorter, Stock Options: The 
Backdating Issues, TAX NOTES TODAY, March 23, 2007, LEXIS 2007 TNT 57-17, at 16.  In addition, Edelson 
and Whisenant review a sample of companies and suggest that, based on this sample, over 500 companies 
engaging in stock option award practices consistent with backdating remain undetected.  Rick Edelson & 
Scott Whisenant, A Study of Companies with Abnormally Favourable Patterns of Executive Stock Option 
Grant Timing 20 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2009).  See infra note 65 for further 
discussion of enforcement.  In the United States, the SEC reporting regulations were changed in 2002 to 
reduce the reporting period for stock option grants to two days.  Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 403, 788-89.  Heron and Lie show that with the introduction of this new two-day 
reporting period, the return pattern associated with backdating is much weaker. Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, 
Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 
271, 273 (2007).  In a later study, Heron and Lie show the percentage of unscheduled grants backdated or 
manipulated fell dramatically following the introduction of the two-day rule.  Heron & Lie, supra note 1, at 
514.  Both studies note, however, that late filings continue to show a strong return pattern consistent with 
backdating, leading these authors to conclude that the efficacy of reporting requirements requires not only 
that grant award disclosures be filed on time but be filed at all.  Heron & Lie, supra note 8, at 294; Heron & 
Lie, supra note 1, at 524.  Despite simplified filing regimes, lax enforcement of the filing rules translates into 
a not insignificant number of insider reports being filed late or not at all.  See Bickley & Shorter supra, at 16; 
&; Lara E. Muller, Stock Option Backdating: Is the Government’s Response Enough to Eliminate the 
Problem or Is It Still a Work in Progress, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 331, 349-50 (2011). 
9
 On the supply side, a frequently cited driver of both the use of stock options in compensation 
packages and backdating in the United States is the corporate tax treatment of non-qualified stock options 
(“NSOs”), which permits corporations to deduct NSOs for tax purposes.  While on the surface this argument 
has some merit, particularly when considered within the framework of tax shelters (which, according to 
Michael Graetz, “are deals done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid”), 
recent evidence suggests that the corporate tax treatment of NSOs was likely not a cause of backdating since 
options in general, and backdated options specifically, tend to be granted by companies with low profitability 
and little evidence of tax sheltering behavior.  Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform Unraveling, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 
 side factors.  While understanding the propensity to backdate undoubtedly requires 
insight on the supply side factors to backdating (as it is the firms that ultimately grant 
executive stock options), without demand there would be no supply.  Therefore 
understanding the drivers that influence demand is critical to understanding the whole 
story behind backdating of executive stock options. 
The question of demand requires consideration of what an executive receives in 
monetary value from a backdated option (i.e., an option that appears to be an at-the-
money option with an earlier grant date but is, in fact, in-the-money on the actual grant 
date) compared to a currently dated at-the-money option.  There are two different points 
in time at which this value can be considered.  The first point in time is the grant date.  At 
that time, the Black-Scholes option pricing model10 (or a variant of this model) could be 
used to estimate the monetary value that an executive actually receives when granted a 
backdated stock option. 11   However, regardless of the Black-Scholes value of a 
backdated option (relative to an at-the-money option) at the time of receipt, what is 
ultimately of interest for executives is the benefit that backdating provides in monetary 
value, assuming they eventually exercise the options.  We therefore focus on the value at 
exercise (and eventual sale of the shares) and demonstrate the role the income tax regime 
plays in determining the after-tax value to the executive.  
This article considers in detail the potential role of personal income taxation in 
influencing demand for backdated options in Canada relative to the United States.  
Considering the role of the personal income tax treatment of executive options is 
important because taxes may influence the demand by executives for backdated options 
by altering the options’ after-tax monetary value.12  In limiting the scope of this article in 
this way, we are not suggesting that taxation is the single most important factor in 
determining demand or that supply factors are not important.  Instead, we are simply 
                                                                                                                                           
69, 83 (2007); see also Jeri Seidman & Bridget Stomberg, Stock-based Compensation and Tax Sheltering: 
Are They Negatively Related Due to Incentives of Tax Benefits? 4 (McCombs Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. ACC 03-11, 2011).  Other supply factors also affect the ability of a corporation to grant 
in-the-money options that have the same before-tax value as backdated at-the-money options.  For example, a 
company listed on the TSX cannot grant discounted stock options.  TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP INC., 
TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 613 (2007).  In contrast, U.S. stock exchanges permit in-the-money stock options 
provided that they are properly disclosed to shareholders, documents have not been falsified, and the options 
are reflected as such in the company’s statement of earnings.  See Compton et al., supra note 3, at 370 
(discussing the differences between U.S. and Canadian stock exchange requirements, as well as relevant 
supply side factors that help explain the phenomenon in each country). 
10
 Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. 
ECON. 637, 637-52 (1973).  The Black-Scholes model is a generally accepted, albeit limited, method for 
calculating the theoretical value of an employee stock option.  The basic intent of the model is to calculate the 
probability that an option will mature in-the-money (i.e., the value of the stock option today is the sum of all 
the probability-weighted payoffs at maturity, assuming that the asset returns follow a log normal distribution 
so that the sum of all the option payoffs at maturity multiplied by the probability of the occurrence of those 
payoffs is the value of the option today, ignoring discounting) by considering six variables: grant date; 
exercise price; option maturity; risk-free rate of interest for the option period; share’s price volatility; and (if 
applicable) dividend yield.  See id.  The drawback of the Black-Scholes model is that it is based on the 
assumption that options can only be exercised at maturity (known as European-style options) and that the 
options are transferable.  Other shortcomings include the fact that the interest rate and volatility are 
constrained as constants in the model and that the underlying stock is assumed to move according to a 
random walk. 
11
 See Walker, supra note 2, at 581-82. 
12
 See infra Appendix I (discussing a simple algebraic representation of the role that discounting 
and taxes play in determining the value of a stock option). 
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advocating that a thorough explanation of the causes of backdating necessitates in-depth 
consideration of each relevant factor in turn and its potential contribution to backdating.13  
We appreciate that income tax treatment is one piece of a larger puzzle that 
constitutes demand for backdated options by executives.  Another piece is the insider 
reporting obligations imposed upon some executives by securities regulations.14  Given a 
lenient disclosure regime for reporting the grant and exercise of stock options,15 as some 
have argued currently exists in Canada,16 backdating could easily go undetected.  Greed 
is often cited as the motive for backdated options.17  However, while greed could account 
for a desire for higher compensation, it cannot account for the form that such 
compensation takes.  As executives could lawfully be paid equivalent amounts in cash (or 
properly dated options), it does not seem likely that greed is, at least by itself, a primary 
motivator for backdating.  A better motivator may be the fact that backdated options are a 
form of what Bebchuk and Fried have called “stealth compensation.” 18   Other 
considerations may affect backdating behavior, such as penalties and concomitant costs if 
the backdating is caught,19 including penalties arising from income tax reassessments and 
actions by securities regulators, as well as attorneys’ fees, loss of employment, and 
potential loss of reputation.20  
In order to assess the role of personal income taxation in backdating stock 
options, this study provides a comparative analysis of the personal income tax regime for 
executive stock options in Canada and the U.S. 21   It is important to understand the 
                                                   
13
 Some argue that a multilateral approach is more appropriate when examining issues surrounding 
stock option backdating.  See, e.g., Amin Mawani, Cancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax and 
Accounting Income Considerations, 20  CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 495, 499-500 (2003).  But in order to be able 
to determine which factors need to be incorporated into the multilateral approach, a detailed unilateral 
approach is required.  This is a common approach in the literature not only in this topic area, but most topic 
areas.  That is, we take the approach of examining the role that personal income tax policy plays in 
determining the monetary value of a backdated stock option, ceteris paribus. 
14
 See Bickley & Shorter, supra note 8, at 11; Compton et al., supra note 8, at 474. 
15




 The former chair of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, has stated that backdating “represents the ultimate in 
greed.”  Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Five More Companies Show Questionable Options Pattern, 
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006; see also Geoffrey Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Backdating Options and Why 
Executive Compensation Is Not All About Norms, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 385, 392 (2006); 
Kristina Minnick & Mengxin Zhao, Backdating and Director Incentives: Money or Reputation?, 32 J. FIN. 
RES. 449, 450-51 (2009). The journal names in this foot note are larger than in others. Others have the 
journal titles in small caps whereas this one does not. E.g., see Fin Econ in footnote 20. 
18
 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 71, 79 (2003) (defining stealth compensation as the practice of blurring or even concealing the 
total amount of compensation). 
19
 See Compton, supra note 3, at 383-86. 
20
 Nevertheless, some studies have found little evidence of reputational penalties resulting from 
backdating scandals. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: 
Evidence from Option Backdating, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 118, 119 (2012). 
21
 The existing backdating literature focuses almost exclusively on the U.S.  See Compton, supra 
note 3, at 391.  We argue that a more complete understanding of the causes of backdating requires research 
that looks beyond the U.S.  We believe that contrasting Canadian and U.S. regimes and evidence, at a 
minimum, can help elucidate the causes of backdating.  In addition, such comparative work can also help 
uncover whether backdating activities are path-dependent and context specific, thereby providing policy 
lessons from and for other jurisdictions.  For example, comparing and contrasting insider reporting 
obligations in a number of countries finds that placing the reporting onus on the corporation rather than the 
individual may have played a role in the lack of backdating in the U.K. and Australia.  See Compton et al., 
 differences in these rules, particularly the extent to which these differences affect the 
after-tax return to a Canadian executive compared to a U.S. executive of backdated 
options.  In the United States, the entire benefit realized by the employee at the time of 
exercise of most executive stock options is included in income, 22  while in Canada, 
assuming certain conditions are met, the benefit is taxed at the same effective rate as 
capital gains (and thus is subject to a lower tax rate than if taxed as regular employment 
income).  Part II considers these personal income tax rules in detail.  In particular, the 
relevant personal income tax rules in the two countries are compared and contrasted to 
demonstrate the role these rules may play in determining the demand for backdated 
options in the two countries. 23   As will be shown, this is potentially an important 
component in the decision of executives to accept backdated stock options and may 
provide an additional incentive for executives to demand them in Canada. 
II. TAX POLICY AND THE DEMAND FOR BACKDATED OPTIONS 
The taxation of stock options varies significantly between Canada and the United 
States.24  In this part we summarize the differences, focusing on backdated options and 
                                                                                                                                           
supra note 8, at 483, 490.  Since current regulations and enforcement in the U.S. have failed to completely 
eradicate the backdating problem, this suggests a continued lack of understanding of the drivers of the 
behavior and that further policy interventions are required.  See id. at 489-90. 
22
 This is because most executive stock options issued in the U.S. are NSOs.  1 EDWARD F. KOREN 
ET AL., ESTATE TAX & PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING § 2:68 (2012).   
23
 While beyond the scope of this paper, we note a few things concerning the corporate taxation of 
executive stock options in the United States that have no counterpart in Canada.  In particular, it has been 
suggested that corporate tax may increase the proclivity to backdate in the United States, but not in Canada, 
because U.S. corporations can deduct the value of most stock option benefits whereas Canadian corporations 
cannot.  We disagree with this view.  Subject to the possible application of § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue 
Code (“I.R.C.”) (which restricts a public corporation’s ability to deduct more than $1 million in 
compensation paid to the corporation’s CEO and next four highest paid officers), U.S. corporations are 
entitled to a deduction for employee stock options only if the employee is required to report the stock option 
benefit as an income inclusion.  See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West Supp. 2011).  Not-in-the-money options are not 
subject to § 162(m) whereas in-the-money options are.  Thus, a corporation is generally entitled to a 
deduction for NSOs and Incentive Stock Options (“ISOs”) where the shares are sold within one year after the 
options are exercised.  NSOs may or may not be subject to the limitation in § 162(m) depending on what 
makes them NSOs, while ISOs held less than one year would not be subject to § 162(m) (because ISOs 
cannot be granted in-the-money).  See id.  However, regardless of how long the stock acquired pursuant to 
ISOs are actually held, it seems fair to assume that at the time of grant of the ISO, the employer could not 
expect a deduction, since no deduction is available if the ultimate share sale qualifies for ISO treatment.  
Therefore from the employer’s perspective, there seems to be no preference accorded to backdated options 
that appear to be ISOs and currently dated options that are, in fact, ISOs.  From the corporation’s perspective, 
the backdating preference would appear to be limited to NSOs that are granted—or, more precisely, appear to 
be granted—not-in-the-money (i.e., stock options in excess of the $100,000 per year threshold for ISOs).  
This is because the corporation is definitely entitled to deduct the value of such options when included in 
income by the employee without the potential application of § 162(m).  See I.R.C. § 422(d) (2006).  A second 
issue is that backdated options, assuming they are discovered, are necessarily NSOs and the employer would 
be entitled to a deduction, subject to the limitation in § 162(m).  See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West Supp. 2011).  
However, the deduction is only of value to the corporation if it is otherwise subject to tax (i.e., it is 
profitable).  Nonetheless, many of the corporations that were cited for backdating in the United States were in 
the high-tech sector and may well not have been profitable.  See Walker, supra note 2, at 566.  In sum, it is 
our view that corporate taxation would have had little impact on the propensity to backdate in the United 
States.   
24
 See generally Daniel Sandler, The Tax Treatment of Employee Stock Options: Generous to a 
Fault, 49 CAN. TAX J. 259 (2001) (discussing how stock options in Canada are more likely to be taxed under 
more favorable rates than they are in the United States). 
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incorporating a discussion of recent U.S. changes regarding the taxation of discounted 
stock options enacted in 2004 on the heels of the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco scandals.  
A. Canadian Personal Income Tax Rules for Executive Stock Options 
Personal income taxation of stock options in Canada is notably less complex and 
more generous from the employee’s perspective than in the United States.  The applicable 
tax rules for stock options granted by publicly-traded companies are set out in section 7 
and paragraph 110(1)(d) of the Canadian Income Tax Act.25  Section 7 pertains to the 
value and timing of the employment income inclusion and paragraph 110(1)(d) provides 
a deduction equal to one-half (reduced to one-fifth for the purposes of computing 
minimum tax26) of the income inclusion if certain conditions set out therein are met.  
All employee stock options share the same general tax treatment in two areas.  
First, unlike employment income (e.g. annual salary or bonus income), which is taxable 
in the year it is received, there are no tax consequences when stock options are granted or 
when they vest; rather, under subsection 7(1), a tax liability does not arise until the time 
the option is exercised, at the earliest.27  The amount that must be included in income 
from employment upon exercise (or later, if certain conditions are met) is equal to the 
difference between the fair market value of the stock on the date the option is exercised 
and the strike price.  Second, upon the sale of the stock acquired pursuant to the option, 
the difference between the proceeds of disposition of the stock and the fair market value 
of the stock on the date the option is exercised is taxed as a capital gain or capital loss, as 
the case may be.  Under section 38 of the I.T.A., the taxable portion is calculated as one-
half of the capital gain or capital loss.28  
There are, however, several exceptions to the general rules described above that 
affect both the amount and timing of the inclusion.  One exception concerns stock options 
granted by a Canadian-controlled private corporation (“CCPC”).  Under subsection 
7(1.1), if certain conditions are met, the inclusion of the employment income benefit is 
deferred until the time that the shares are sold.29  In addition, there is a deduction equal to 
one-half of the inclusion if either the option strike price is equal to or greater than the fair 
market value of the share at the time of the grant (section 110(1)(d)) or if the shares 
acquired on exercise are held for a minimum two- year period before sale (paragraph 
                                                   
25
 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (“I.T.A.”), s. 7, 110(1)(d). 
26
 Minimum tax serves a similar purpose to Alternative Minimum Tax in the United States, 
although it is imposed only on individuals (other than certain trusts).  See infra note 39.  Minimum tax is 
charged at the lowest marginal tax rate (currently fifteen percent) on an individual’s adjusted taxable income 
less the individual’s basic exemption (currently $40,000).  Adjusted taxable income is, essentially, taxable 
income adding back all or part of various specified tax preferences.  For the purposes of adjusted taxable 
income, the tax preference in paragraph 110(1)(d) is recomputed to be two-fifths of the amount otherwise 
deducted under that provision (i.e., two-fifths of one-half of the stock option benefit).  See I.T.A., s. 
127.52(1)(h)(ii)(B).  In the event that minimum tax exceeds tax otherwise payable, the excess may be carried 
forward seven years to reduce tax otherwise payable.  Given that the minimum tax rate is a flat rate equal to 
the lowest marginal rate, relatively few higher-paid employees would be subject to minimum tax even if they 
have substantial stock option benefits (assuming that the stock option benefits are their only tax preference). 
27
 I.T.A., s. 7(1). 
28
 I.T.A., s. 38(a).  From 1972 to 1988, the inclusion rate for capital gains and losses was one-half.  
In 1988, the rate rose to two-thirds and in 1990 the rate was subsequently increased to three-quarters.  In 
February 2000 the rate was decreased to two-thirds and in October 2000 it was further decreased to one-half. 
29
 I.T.A., s. 7(1.1). 
 110(1)(d.1)).30  As the backdating scandal mainly involves public corporations, we do 
not consider the tax treatment of options issued by CCPCs further. 
For options issued by a public corporation, one-half of the stock option benefit is 
deductible under paragraph 110(1)(d) if three conditions are met: (1) the option strike 
price is equal to or greater than the fair market value of the share at the time of the grant; 
(2) the optioned shares are “plain vanilla” common shares; and (3) the employee deals at 
arm’s length with the employer.31  In addition, for options issued by public corporations 
after February 27, 2000, and exercised prior to 4:00 p.m. (EST) on March 4, 2010,32 the 
employment income benefit is deferred until the time the shares are sold if the following 
conditions, stipulated in subsections 7(8) to (16) of the I.T.A. are met: (1) the recipient is 
a Canadian resident; (2) the underlying shares are traded on a Canadian or foreign 
prescribed stock exchange; and (3) the individual is entitled to the deduction under 
paragraph 110(1)(d).33  The deferral, however, is limited to the first $100,000 worth34 of 
options per year of vesting.  
B. US Tax Rules for Executive Stock Options 
In the United States, the taxation of employee stock options depends on their 
characterization as non-statutory stock options (“NSOs”) or statutory stock options, 
which includes incentive stock options (“ISOs”) and employee stock purchase plans 
(“ESPPs”).35  There is no difference in the treatment of options granted by a public 
corporation and a private corporation.36 
In order for an option to be treated as an ISO, a number of requirements must be 
met including: (1) the exercise price must not be less than the fair market value of the 
stock at the time of the grant; (2) the exercised shares must be held for the longer of two 
years from the grant date or one year from the exercise date; and (3) the combined value, 
as determined by the fair market value of the underlying shares on the grant date, that can 
be acquired for the first time in any calendar year (i.e., in the year of vesting) cannot 
exceed US $100,000.37  For an ISO, there are no income tax consequences until the time 
the shares are sold,38 unless the Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”)39 applies.  Upon the 
                                                   
30
 Even if both conditions are met, stock options granted by CCPCs qualify for either a deduction 
under paragraph 110(1)(d) or paragraph 110(1)(d.1) but not both.  I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d), 110(1)(d.1).  In 
addition, to qualify for the deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d), the option must be for “garden variety” 
common shares and the employer and employee must deal at arm’s length both before and after the exercise 
of the options.  I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d).   
31
 I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d). 
32
 In the March 4, 2010 federal budget, it was announced that subsections 7(8) to (15) of the I.T.A. 
will be repealed with effect for options exercised after 4 p.m. on that day.  Sustaining Canada’s Economic 
Recovery Act, R.S.C. 2010, c. 25, s. 39. 
33
 I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d). 
34
 The value is based on the fair market value of the underlying shares at the time the options are 
granted. 
35
 See generally I.R.C. § 83 (2006) (tax rules applicable to NSOs); I.R.C. § 421 (2006) (tax rules 
applicable to ISOs); I.R.C. § 422 (2006) (further tax rules applicable to ISOs).  ESPPs are generally not of 
interest with respect to the backdating discussion since they are not granted to employees, but rather the 
employer’s shares are made available to all employees to purchase through payroll deductions.  
Consequently, our discussion will be limited to ISOs and NSOs. 
36
 See I.R.C. §§ 83, 421, 422 (2006). 
37
 I.R.C. §§ 422(a)(1), (b)(4), (d)(1) (2006).  To the extent that the value (so determined) of the 
stock options exceeds US $100,000, the excess options are treated as NSOs.  See I.R.C. §§ 422(d)(1), 83 
(2006). 
38
 See I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) (2006). 
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sale of the shares, the difference between the sale price and the exercise price under the 
option is treated as a capital gain, and since the shares must have been held for at least 
one year, the gain is taxed at the long-term capital gains rate of fifteen percent.40  
An option award that does not, at the time of grant, meet the requirements of an 
ISO is taxed as an NSO.41  If an NSO has a readily ascertainable fair market value at the 
time of grant, the difference between the option’s value and the amount paid by the 
grantee is taxed as income in the year of the grant or in the year that the option is 
exercised, depending on the taxpayer’s election.42  However, in order for an option to 
have a readily ascertainable fair market value it must be either publicly traded or meet the 
following four conditions: (1) be transferable; (2) be exercisable in full on the grant date; 
(3) not be subject to any conditions that affect the value of the option (e.g., vesting and 
transferability restrictions); and (4) the fair market value of the underlying share must be 
readily determinable.43  Since NSOs are not generally publicly traded and fail to meet 
any of the first three conditions, most NSOs are not taxable at grant.  
                                                                                                                                           
39
 The AMT is a tax designed to ensure that no taxpayer—whether individual or corporate—may 
disproportionally benefit from certain tax preferences.  See §§ I.R.C. §§ 56, 58-59 (2006); I.R.C. 55, 57 
(West 2011).  Thus, a taxpayer must pay the greater of (i) his or her regular tax liability or (ii) his or her 
tentative minimum tax liability, calculated under the AMT rules.  See I.R.C. § 55 (West 2011).  To be 
precise, the AMT imposed is the amount by which the tentative minimum tax liability exceeds the regular tax 
liability.  Id.  The tentative minimum tax liability is calculated by recomputing regular tax liability, first by 
adding back to taxable income tax preference items and by making certain adjustments in order to determine 
the alternative minimum taxable income (“AMTI”), then by applying the appropriate AMT rate to the amount 
by which AMTI exceeds the taxpayer’s exemption amount.  I.R.C. § 55(b) (West 2011).  The AMT rate for 
individuals is 26% of such amount up to $175,000 and 28% of any excess.  I.R.C. § 55(b)(1) (West 2011).  
For individuals, the exemption amount depends on whether the individual is married and filing a joint return 
(in which case the amount is $45,000) or is a surviving spouse ($45,000) or is single ($33,750).  I.R.C. 
§ 55(d) (West 2011).  The exemption amount begins to be phased out when AMTI exceeds a threshold 
($150,000 for a married individual filing a joint return; $112,500 for a single individual).  Id.  The deferral of 
the income inclusion for an ISO is an adjustment in computing AMTI, resulting in the addition to regular 
taxable income in the tax year in which the option is exercised of an amount equal to the difference between 
the fair market value of the shares and the exercise price of the option.  I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2006).  However, 
where the exercise of the option and the sale of the shares occur in the same year, and the sale price for the 
shares is less than the value of the shares at the time the option was exercised, ISO treatment is not available 
since the holding period requirement has not been met.  The amount included in income (for both regular tax 
and AMT purposes) is the difference between the sale price of the share and the strike price under the option.  
I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(3); 422(c)(2) (2006).  The long-term capital gains rate remains applicable for AMT purposes; 
in other words, the reduced rate is not treated as a tax preference for AMT purposes.  I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); 
I.R.C. § 55(b)(3) (West 2011).  Certain AMT may be carried forward and applied to reduce the general tax 
payable in subsequent years (to the extent that the general tax exceeds the tentative alternative minimum tax 
liability for the subsequent year).  See I.R.C. § 53 (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (allowing carry forward for a 
credit for the prior year’s minimum tax liability that resulted from certain timing differences).  See infra sub-
part III.D (illustrating in Example 4 the effect of AMT); see generally Francine J. Lipman, Incentive Stock 
Options and the Alternative Minimum Tax: The Worst of Time, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 337 (2002) (providing 
a detailed discussion of the AMT and its application to ISOs). 
40
 I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).  Prior to 2003, the long-term capital gains rate was generally 20%.  In 2003, 
the rate was reduced to 5% for individuals in the lowest two income brackets and 15% for all others.  In 
2008, the long-term capital gain rate for individuals in the lowest two tax brackets (currently 5% and 15%) 
was further reduced to zero.  These reduced rates are currently effective until the end of 2012.  Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat 
3296 (extending reduced rates from the end of 2010 until the end of 2012).   
41
 See I.R.C. §§ 83, 422(d)(1) (2006). 
42
 I.R.C. § 83(a)-(b) (2006). 
43
 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(2) (as amended in 2004). 
44
 I.R.C. § 421(b) (2006). 
 If an employee exercises options that are otherwise qualified as ISOs but then 
disposes of the shares within one year of exercise or within two years of when the options 
were granted, the employee stock option benefit (as determined above for a NSO) is not 
included in income until the time of sale of the shares and the difference between the sale 
proceeds and the fair market value of the shares at the time of exercise is taxed as a short-
term capital gain. 44   Short-term capital gains are taxed at the individual’s ordinary 
income tax rate.45  However, if the shares decline in value between the time of exercise 
and the time of sale, then the employee benefit is limited to the difference between the 
sale proceeds and the strike price under the option.46 
Prior to the introduction of § 409A to the Code in late 2004, if the fair market 
value of an NSO was not readily ascertainable at the time of grant, no income was 
recognized for tax purposes until the option was exercised, regardless of whether or not 
the options were in-the-money on the grant date.47  In either case, upon exercise, the 
amount included in income (and subject to tax at normal tax rates as compensation 
income) was equal to the difference between the strike price and the fair market value of 
the stock on the date of exercise.48  This amount was also added to the basis of the stock 
for capital gains purposes. 49   Any further taxation was deferred until the underlying 
shares were sold, when the gain or loss—i.e., the difference between the sale price and 
the fair market value on the exercise date—was taxed as a capital gain or loss.50  If the 
shares were held for one year or less, the gain was taxed as a short-term capital gain 
(taxable at regular marginal rates) whereas if the shares were held for more than a year, 
the applicable rate was the long-term capital gains rate, which is currently fifteen 
percent.51  This tax treatment remains applicable to options provided that they are not in-
the-money at the grant date. 
Following corporate and accounting scandals such as Enron, Tyco, and 
WorldCom, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 added § 409A to the Code,52 which 
radically changed the taxation of deferred compensation, including discounted stock 
options.53  I.R.C. § 409A provides in part: 
§ 409A. Inclusion in gross income of deferred compensation under 
nonqualified deferred compensation plans 
(a) Rules relating to constructive receipt  
(1) Plan failures  
                                                   
44
 I.R.C. § 421(b) (2006). 
SPACING45 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); I.R.C. § 1222 (West 2011). 
45
 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); I.R.C. § 1222 (West 2011). 
46
 See I.R.C. § 421(b) (2006). 
47
 See I.R.C. §§ 409A; 83(e) (2006).  
48
 See I.R.C. § 83 (2006). 
49
 See id. 
50
 See I.R.C. § 1221 (2006). 
51
 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); I.R.C. § 1222 (West 2011). 
52
 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418, 1635-42. 
53
 Although the new regime was effective October 2004, corporations were essentially given until 
December 31, 2006, to modify any unvested and unexercised stock options to ensure compliance with 
§ 409A by increasing the exercise price to the fair market value of the stock on the grant date; however, if 
any payments were made to compensate employees for the revised option exercise price, these payments 
were subject to § 409A.  See I.R.C. § 409A (2006). 
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(A) Gross income inclusion  
(i) In general.—If at any time during a taxable year a nonqualified 
deferred compensation plan—  
(I) fails to meet the requirements of paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), 
or  
(II) is not operated in accordance with such requirements,  
all compensation deferred under the plan for the taxable year and all 
preceding taxable years shall be includible in gross income for the 
taxable year to the extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture 
and not previously included in gross income.  
(ii) Application only to affected participants.—Clause (i) shall only apply 
with respect to all compensation deferred under the plan for participants 
with respect to whom the failure relates.  
 
(B) Interest and additional tax payable with respect to previously 
deferred compensation 
(i) In general.—If compensation is required to be included in gross 
income under subparagraph (A) for a taxable year, the tax imposed by 
this chapter for the taxable year shall be increased by the sum of—  
(I) the amount of interest determined under clause (ii), and  
(II) an amount equal to 20 percent of the compensation which is 
required to be included in gross income.  
(ii) Interest.—For purposes of clause (i), the interest determined under 
this clause for any taxable year is the amount of interest at the 
underpayment rate plus 1 percentage point on the underpayments that 
would have occurred had the deferred compensation been includible in 
gross income for the taxable year in which first deferred or, if later, the 
first taxable year in which such deferred compensation is not subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture. 
I.R.C. § 409A applies to a broad range of deferred compensation, although it also 
provides a number of exceptions, including employee stock options that are granted not-
in-the-money. 54   However, in-the-money options (including backdated options that 
appear to be not-in-the-money options) are caught by the section.  Under 
§ 409A(a)(1)(A), the “compensation deferred under the plan” must be included in the 
employee’s gross income “for the taxable year to the extent not subject to a substantial 
risk of forfeiture and not previously included in gross income.”55  In addition to the 
income inclusion, § 409A(a)(1)(B) provides that the tax payable on such income is 
                                                   
54
 See supra note 4 (discussing the difference between in-the-money and not-in-the-money 
options). 
55
 I.R.C. § 409(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 increased by “premium interest tax”56 plus an “additional tax” (commonly referred to as 
a penalty tax) equal to twenty percent of the compensation required to be included in 
gross income. 57   Generally speaking, a taxpayer must include in income an amount 
attributable to a grant of in-the-money stock options in the year that the options vest and 
in every subsequent year up to and including the year of exercise (to the extent not 
included in income in a previous year).  Neither § 409A nor the final regulations issued to 
date under the statute specify the amount included in income (and the basis for the 
additional tax).  However, the proposed regulations indicate that the amount to be 
included is the intrinsic value of the option on the last day of the employee’s taxation 
year in which the option vests and any subsequent year in which a vested option remains 
unexercised, and, in the year of exercise, the actual value on the exercise date.58  The 
income inclusion and penalty tax apply regardless of when (or if) the options are 
ultimately exercised. 59   In effect, § 409A provides for income inclusion (and a 
corresponding penalty tax) in each year following the year in which an option vests, and 
until and including the year of exercise, depending on the value of the underlying shares 
on December 31 (or the date that the options are exercised in) of the subsequent year.60 
                                                   
56
 In-the-money options will not be subject to premium interest tax.  Premium interest tax is 
computed only for the period from the time of vesting to the time that § 409A is breached.  See I.R.C. 
§ 409A(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).  Since in-the-money options breach § 409A when granted (i.e., at the time of 
vesting, if the options are vested at the time granted, or otherwise prior to vesting), there is no period during 
which premium interest tax is computed.   
57
 I.R.C. § 6662(a) (West 2011). 
58
 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-4(b)(6), 73 Fed. Reg. 74.380, 74.399 (Dec. 5, 2008).  Prior to the 
issuance of the proposed regulation, the IRS had issued Notice 2005-1 setting forth the IRS’s initial guidance 
on the provision.  I.R.S. Notice 2005-1, 2005-1 C.B. 274. Neither that notice nor the final regulations 
released on April 10, 2007 (applicable to taxation years beginning after December 21, 2008) addressed the 
calculation of the amount included in income under § 409A.  Interim guidance in Notice 2006-100 
(applicable to the 2005 and 2006 taxation years) provided that the intrinsic value of a vested stock option on 
the year-end of the employee (i.e., December 31) is the basis for the income inclusion, premium interest tax 
(if applicable) and additional tax, assuming that the options were not modified to avoid the application of 
§ 409A.  I.R.S. Notice 2006-100, 2006-2 C.B. 1109.  The preamble to the proposed regulation states in part: 
“The Treasury Department and the IRS recognize that the spread [i.e., intrinsic value] generally is less than 
the fair market value of the stock right, which is used for purposes of determining the amount taxable under 
other Code provisions . . . .  However, because these types of stock rights typically will fail to comply with 
section 409A(a) in multiple years, a taxpayer who holds such a stock right generally will be required to 
include amounts in income under section 409A in more than one taxable year.  Therefore, the Treasury 
Department and the IRS believe that it is more appropriate to use the spread for purposes of applying section 
409A(a) to stock rights.”  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-4(b)(6), 73 Fed. Reg. 74.380, 74.386 (Dec. 5, 2008). 
59
 If the options expire unexercised—in other words, the employee’s right to the deferred income is 
permanently lost—the employee is entitled to a deduction at that time equal to the amounts previously 
included in income under § 409A.  However, there is no deduction for the additional tax previously assessed.  
See 2008-51 I.R.B. 1297, 1336-37 (Dec. 22, 2008). 
60
 Consider the following simple example.  Suppose that on December 31, 2009, an employee of 
XCo receives 30,000 employee stock options at an exercise price of $10 per share.  The options have a ten-
year life and one-third of the options each vest on December 31 of 2010, 2011, and 2012.  Suppose that the 
shares have a fair market value on December 31, 2009, of $12 per share (i.e., the options are granted in-the-
money or, alternatively, the options may be backdated to an earlier date (such as December 1, 2009) when the 
fair market value of the shares was $10 per share).  Because the options were in-the-money on December 31, 
2009, the actual grant date, they would be subject to tax under § 409A.  See I.R.C. § 409A (2006).  Suppose 
that on December 31, 2010, the XCo shares are trading at $14 per share.  On that date, 10,000 options vest 
(i.e., are no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture).  Because the options were in-the-money on 
December 31, 2009, they would be subject to tax under § 409A.  See id.  Consequently, the employee must 
include in gross income in 2010 the amount of $40,000 ($4 per share × 10,000 shares), which would be 
subject to tax at the employee’s marginal rates.  In addition, the employee would have to pay an “additional 
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C. Tax Regime and Backdated Options 
Based on the above discussion, the most preferential compensation regime from 
an executive’s tax perspective in either Canada or the United States is one in which the 
options are granted not-in-the-money (or for our purposes, backdated to appear as such).  
In Canada, not only is there no super-inclusion or penalty tax regardless of the 
option’s exercise price relative to the value of the shares on the option grant date, but also 
provided that the options are at-the-money (or backdated to appear as such), only one-
half of the option benefit is included in income for tax purposes regardless of the length 
of time that the shares are held after exercise.61  This demonstrates a clear tax advantage 
for stock option compensation, provided that the options are granted not-in-the-money (or 
reported as such).   
In Canada, employees who receive backdated stock options, the equivalent of in-
the-money options (assuming that the fair market value of the shares on the real grant 
date exceeds the strike price under the option), may be reassessed by the Canada Revenue 
Agency not only to deny any deduction claimed under paragraph 110(1)(d), but also to 
include the employee benefit from the option in income in an earlier year than that in 
which the employee reported the benefit (and offsetting deduction) for tax purposes.  
Such reassessment would also include interest, compounded daily at a relatively high 
rate.  Furthermore, an employee who knowingly received backdated options and reported 
them as if they were not-in-the-money could be subject to penalties 62  for gross 
negligence and perhaps even charged with tax evasion.63 
                                                                                                                                           
tax” of $8,000 (20% of $40,000).  No premium interest tax is payable.  See supra note 56.  Suppose further 
that on December 31, 2011, when an additional 10,000 options vest, the fair market value of the shares of 
XCo is $17 per share.  The employee would have to include $100,000 in income in 2011 [$7 × 20,000 – 
$40,000 (the amount included in 2010)].  This amount would be subject to tax at the employee’s marginal 
rate and, in addition, the employee would have to pay a tax of $20,000.  Finally, suppose on December 31, 
2012, when the final 10,000 options vest, the shares of XCo are trading at $15 per share.  The employee 
would have to include $10,000 in income for that year [$5 × 30,000 – $140,000 (the aggregate amounts 
included in income in 2011 and 2012)] plus $1,000 additional tax.  In a subsequent year in which the options 
remain outstanding, if the shares of XCo are trading above $15 per share, the employee may be subject to 
further income inclusion and additional tax under § 409A.  Finally, suppose in 2017, the employee exercises 
the options when the shares are trading at $21 per share (and on no previous December 31 had the trading 
price of XCo shares reached that amount), the employee would be required to include in income $330,000 
less the aggregate amounts included in gross income under § 409A in previous years, plus additional tax at 
the rate of 20% on such amount.  See I.R.C. § 409A (2006).   
61
 See I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d). 
62
 The expected cost of any such penalties would presumably be a consideration in whether or not 
an executive decides to engage in backdating.  In Canada, an executive faces a penalty amounting to 50% of 
the increase in tax payable caused by the backdating in that taxation year (assuming that the improper 
reporting on the part of the employee amounts to gross negligence).  I.T.A., s. 163(2).  In the United States, 
the penalty would likely be less than in Canada, as it is calculated as 20% of the underpayment of tax in that 
taxation year for negligence or disregard of the rules or regulations, or 40% of the underpayment of tax in the 
case of a gross valuation misstatement.  See I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (h) (West 2011).  The underpayment of tax in 
the United States will likely be less than in Canada because backdating provides less of a benefit in the 
United States.  See Compton et al., supra note 3, at 373-74.  In addition to quantifying the penalty, it is 
important to consider the probability of such a penalty being applied.  Given the evidence to date, it is more 
likely that an executive in the United States will be caught for backdating options than an executive in 
Canada.  If the backdating is not caught by securities regulators, it is highly unlikely that the Canada Revenue 
Agency will independently investigate possible backdating behavior.  Canada’s securities regulators are 
generally considered to be less aggressive in investigating backdating behavior than the United States’ 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Service has given backdated stock 
options specific recognition as a Tier I issue for its Large and Mid-Size Division.  I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB 
 In the United States, employees who receive backdated ISOs or backdated NSOs 
are, in fact, receiving deferred compensation subject to tax under I.R.C § 409A.  In 
addition, ISOs that are backdated do not meet the necessary requirements for preferential 
tax treatment (assuming that the shares are held for at least a year after exercise) and 
instead must be treated as backdated NSOs for tax purposes.  However, rank and file 
employees who receive ISOs may not be aware they were granted discounted stock 
options and could be reassessed on the basis that a tax liability arose in the year the 
options vested (and subject to an income inclusion and additional tax under I.R.C. 
§ 409A) in addition to the year the shares are ultimately sold.  The relative share values at 
the time of vesting (and December 31 of each year that vested options remain 
unexercised) give rise to significant tax differences upon exercise or sale.  The 
corporation’s executives may have knowingly received backdated options and reported 
them as if they were at-the-money.  In addition to the accelerated reporting under I.R.C. 
§ 409A, such executives could be subject to gross negligence penalties and perhaps 
charged with tax evasion.64  Based on the standard model of tax evasion by Allingham 
and Sandmo, 65  where compliance is positively associated with the size of penalty 
assessed if caught, one might expect that the punitive consequences of I.R.C. § 409A 
should have reduced the incidence of backdating in the United States.  However, there 
continues to be some evidence of backdating in the United States, 66  suggesting that 
executives may perceive there to be a low risk that the IRS will apply I.R.C. § 409A to 
backdated options. 
                                                                                                                                           
04-0407-036 (June 15, 2007).  The heightened probability of being caught by either regulatory body in the 
United States likely contributes to the decreased incidence of backdated or manipulated option grants in the 
United States, ceteris paribus.  See also infra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the positive 
correlation between compliance and the size of penalty if caught). 
63
 The implications of this could reach even further since it previously has been found that non-
compliant corporations are three times more likely than compliant corporations to be managed by executives 
who have evaded personal taxes.  See David Joulfaian, Corporate Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences, 
82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 698, 698-99 (2000). 
64
 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
65
 See generally Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972) (discussing how compliance with reporting regulations increases as 
penalties for evasion increase).  The Allingham-Sandmo model has been extended in a number of dimensions 
over the last thirty years.  See generally Kim Border & Joel Sobel, Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Audit 
and Plunder, 54 REV. ECON. STUD. 525 (1987) (discussing the positive relationship between a tax collector’s 
threat of audit and a taxpayer’s truthful income reporting); Helmuth Cremer, Maurice Marchand & Pierre 
Pestieau, Evading, Auditing and Taxing: the Equity-Compliance Tradeoff, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 67 (1990) 
(analyzing the social welfare elements of tax parameters that try to maximize compliance); Dilip Mookherjee 
& Ivan P.L. Png, Optimal Auditing, Insurance and Redistribution, 104 Q. J. ECON. 399 (1989) (incorporating 
the role of moral hazard in the penalty-compliance analysis); Isabel Sanchez & Joel Sobel, Hierarchical 
Design and Enforcement of Income Tax Policies, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 345 (1993) (analyzing the role that 
hierarchy within the government plays in setting compliance-conscious tax policies); Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Audit Classes and Tax Enforcement Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 229 (1987) (analyzing the regressive bias of a 
compliance scheme that consists of different audit classes); Greg Trandel & Arthur Snow, Progressive 
Income Taxation and the Underground Economy, 62 ECON. LETTERS 217 (1999) (arguing that the source of 
one’s income can contribute to one’s likelihood of successfully avoiding penalties for underreporting); Harry 
Watson, Tax Evasion and Labor Markets, 27 J. PUB. ECON. 231 (1985) (discussing how different labor 
markets have different potentials for tax evasion).  For an additional survey of this literature, see James 
Andreoni, Brian Erard, & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 818-19, 823-25 
(1998); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1429-36 (A. J. Auerbach and M. Felstein eds., 2002). 
66
  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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III. QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF BACKDATING: EXAMPLES 
To demonstrate the tax consequences of backdated options in each country, 
consider the following example.  An executive at a publicly traded company is the 
recipient of an option grant for 30,000 shares which expires ten years after the date of the 
grant.  This award is dated as having been granted on October 16 when the share price 
was $14.25, but in reality was granted on November 30 when the share price was $18.40.  
For simplicity and ease of comparison, we assume that the individual faces a marginal tax 
rate of twenty-nine percent in both countries.  It is also assumed, in the case of the U.S. 
executive, that such options expire or are all exercised prior to the introduction and 
application of I.R.C. § 409A.67  For the purposes of demonstrating the impact, if any, of 
minimum tax in Canada and AMT in the United States, it is assumed that the executive 
has gross taxable income not derived from any issuance, exercise or sale of stock options 
or the underlying stock, of $150,000 and does not benefit from any tax preference other 
than the preference (if any) associated with employee stock options.  Based on this 
assumption, minimum tax will not apply in any of the examples and AMT will apply only 
in the fourth example. 
Each example compares four scenarios in each country: (1) at-the-money 
backdated options; (2) at-the-money currently dated options; (3) fixed value options; and 
(4) currently dated in-the-money options with the same strike price as the backdated 
options (i.e., if the employee properly reported the backdated options for tax purposes).  
They each set out in the last row the “Canadian advantage,” if any, that the Canadian 
executive receives compared to his U.S. counterpart in the same scenario.  In all cases 
where an advantage exists (except the fourth example, where the advantage stems from 
the application of AMT in the U.S. in the year of exercise), it is due exclusively to the 
deduction that the Canadian executive enjoys under I.T.A. paragraph 110(1)(d), for 
which there is no U.S. equivalent.  
A. Example 1—Exercise and Sale on Same Day 
The first example assumes that the individual exercises the options and sells the 
resulting shares on the same day, which is a common occurrence.68  The sale price of the 
shares on the date of exercise is $22.77.  Table 1 summarizes the tax consequences of this 
example in Canada and the United States. 
  
                                                   
67
 Although § 409A was introduced in 2004, corporations were given until the end of 2006 to bring 
unvested and unexercised stock options into compliance with § 409A.  See supra note 53. 
68
 See, e.g., Jennifer N. Carpenter & Barbara Remmers, Executive Stock Option Exercises and 
Insider Information, 74 J. BUS. 513, 514 (2001); Eli Ofek and David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-based 
Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367, 1368 (2000).  The exception to 
this general trend occurred prior to May 1991 in the United States when insiders had to hold the stock they 
acquired through option exercise for six months.  See Carpenter & Remmers, supra. 
 Table 1: Summary of Tax Implication from Example 1 and Example 2, Individual Exercises and Sells on the Same Date 







Backdated At-the-Money Reduced Share In-the-Money 
 At Exercise/Sale At Exercise/Sale 
# of Options 30,000 30,000 23,234 30,000 30,000 30,000 23,234 30,000 
Exercise Price $14.25 $18.4 $18.4 $14.25 $14.25 $18.4 $18.4 $14.25 
Sale Price $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 
Total Income 
Benefit $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 
Deduction $127,800 $65,550 $50,766 $- N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Taxable income 
benefit  $127,800 $65,550 $50,766 $255,600 $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 
Tax Owed $37,062 $19,010 $14,722 $74,124 $74,124 $38,019 $29,444 $74,124 
Net employee 
benefit $218,538 $112,091 $86,810 $181,476 $181,476 $93,081 $72,088 $181,476 
Canadian 
advantage (%) 20.42  20.42  
              




For a Canadian executive, if the option is “successfully” reported as an at-the-money grant awarded 
on October 16 with a strike price of $14.25, then the income benefit subject to tax is calculated as 
the difference between the fair market value of the shares on the date of exercise and the strike 
price multiplied by the number of options awarded, which is $255,600.  The individual claims a 
deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d), which reduces the income inclusion to $127,800.  As the sale 
price is equal to the price of the shares at the time the options were exercised , there is no capital 
gain or loss to report.  The individual faces a tax liability of $37,062, and the net after-tax benefit to 
the executive is $218,538.  This is reported in the first column of Table 1.  
If, instead, the option had been properly dated as November 30 and had an associated strike 
price of $18.40 (the fair market value on that date), then the individual would have reported an 
income benefit of $131,100, claimed the deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d), which would have 
reduced the overall income inclusion to $65,550, resulting in a tax liability of $19,009.50 and a net 
after-tax benefit to the employee of $112,091.50.  
This example assumed that the option plan is based on receiving a fixed number of shares 
(30,000) as part of a fixed-share option plan.  However, as an additional wrinkle, Column 3 
considers the difference in value of backdating if the employer used a fixed-value option plan.  
Under a fixed-value option plan, an executive is given a fixed dollar amount of options (rather than 
a fixed number of options).  In this example, it is assumed that under a fixed-value option plan the 
executive is to receive $241,050 worth of options.69  If the options are granted on November 30 
with a strike price of $18.40, this would give the executive 23,234 options, while if the executive 
received the options backdated to the October 16 strike price of $14.25, he or she would receive 
30,000 options.  This represents a twenty-nine percent increase (6,767) in the number of options 
received as a result of backdating.  Thus, if the corporation awarded fixed-value options, then at the 
strike price of $18.40, the individual would have only received 23,234 options (rather than 30,000 
options), which when exercised would have resulted in $14,722.22 of tax liability and a net after-
tax benefit of $86,810.36.  
Finally, if the executive properly reported the backdated options as in-the-money options 
for tax purposes, thereby forgoing the deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d), the tax liability would 
have been $74,124 and the net after-tax benefit would have been $181,476.  
In summary, the after-tax benefit to the Canadian executive of a backdated option is higher 
than in any other case.  In fact, the after-tax value of the backdated option is $37,062 higher than if 
the option were reported as being in-the-money and $106,447.50 higher than an at-the-money 
option granted on November 30.  If the corporation issued fixed value options, then had the option 
been properly awarded on November 30 rather than reported as being awarded on October 16, the 
individual would have received 23,234 options priced at $18.40 rather than 30,000 priced at $14.25 
and would have obtained an after-tax benefit of $86,810.36, the lowest of all cases.  
In considering the case of the U.S. executive, since the individual exercised the options and 
sold the shares on the same day, this is a disqualified disposition of an ISO, and therefore the 
options would be taxed as NSOs and the income inclusion for the U.S. executive is included in the 
same taxation year as the disposition of the shares.  In all cases, the resulting tax liability is greater 
                                                   
69
 We have assumed this amount for ease of calculation. 
 than or equal to the tax assessed in Canada, assuming equivalent marginal rates.  The most 
interesting point of this example is that prior to the introduction of I.R.C. § 409A, the net after-tax 
benefit enjoyed by the executive is identical for the backdated option reported as an at-the-money 
option and the currently dated in-the-money option with the same $14.25 strike price.  Because 
there is no deduction in the United States comparable to paragraph 110(1)(d) of the I.T.A., the tax 
payable in these two cases is the same ($74,124), resulting in an after-tax benefit of $181,476.  
This example suggests that until the introduction of I.R.C. § 409A, and for tax purposes 
only, a U.S. executive would have been indifferent between backdated options and discounted 
options, but would have preferred either of these to at-the-money options granted on November 30.  
The example also implies that the personal income tax regime in Canada may cause an individual 
to prefer a backdated option over any other option type.70  In the United States, on the other hand, 
prior to the introduction of I.R.C. § 409A, an individual would have been indifferent between a 
backdated option and an in-the-money option. 
B. Example 2—Vest Over Five Years, Sale on Same Day as Exercise 
In the second case, we extend our example to include the fact that the options vest at a rate 
of one-fifth (or 6,000 options) per year over five years.  We maintain the assumption that the 
exercise date is the same as the date of sale.  In this case, the tax treatment (and after-tax benefit) in 
both Canada and the United States is identical to that in Example 1.71  
C. Example 3—Vest Over Five Years, Sale in Same Year as Exercise 
In the third case, we extend Example 2 by changing the sale date to a date later in the same 
year as the exercise date.  The price of the underlying shares on the exercise date is still $22.77, 
and the sale price is assumed to be $25.  Table 2 summarizes the tax consequence of this example 
in Canada and the United States. 
                                                   
70
 While significant empirical research has been done on backdating in the United States, there has been almost 
no empirical work on this subject published in Canada.  To our knowledge, Compton et al., supra note 3, remains the 
only academic study on backdating in Canada, arguing that “[t]his void is likely not reflective of the lack of backdating or 
option timing in Canada” but that “[t]he primary reason for this dearth of research in Canada can be attributed to the 
differences in the availability of empirical data necessary to examine backdating in the United States and Canada.”  
Compton et al., supra note 3, at 366, 376.  For example, Siskinds LLP, a Canadian law firm specializing in class actions, 
has investigated stock option awards of a number of companies trading on the TSX and has found evidence of backdating 
behavior or other stock option manipulation in thirty-five companies and is investigating suspicious behavior in twenty-
five others.  Julius Melnitzer, Manipulation ‘Serious Problem’, FIN. POST, Sept. 19, 2007, at FP1.  In addition, investment 
researchers found evidence of options timing among S&P/TSX 60 companies:  “on average, prices were 50 basis points 
higher 10 days before the grant date, and more than 100 basis points higher 15 days after the grant date.”  SAM LA BELL 
& CHRIS SILVESTRE WHY ARE THEIR NAMES IN CAPS?, VERITAS INVESTMENT RESEARCH, STOCK OPTION 
BACKDATING: COULD IT HAPPEN HERE? WHY IS TITLE IN CAPS? 3 (2006).  Should be  Sam La Bell and Chris 
Silvestre, Veritas Investment Research, Stock Options Backdating: Could It Happen Here? 
Finally, a number of Canadian companies have voluntarily and proactively, albeit quietly, launched internal 
reviews of their options granting procedures.  See Compton et al., supra note 3, at 378.  However, the options dating 
practices of only a handful of companies have garnered media attention in Canada. 
71
 Had these options been issued or outstanding after 2004, the tax treatment in the United States would be 
radically different (and more severe) for in-the-money options due to the application of I.R.C. § 409A.  See supra sub-
part II.B and accompanying notes. 
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Table 2: Summary of Tax Implication from Example 3; Individual Exercises and Sells on Different Dates but Same 
Year Can’t this be made to fit on one page? 







Backdated At-the-Money Reduced Share In-the-Money 
 At Exercise At Exercise 
# of Options 30,000 30,000 23,234 30,000 30,000 30,000 23,234 30,000 
Exercise Price $14 $18 $18 $14 $14 $18 $18 $14 
FMV at 
Exercise $23 $23 $23 $23 $23 $23 $23 $23 
Total Income 
Benefit $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 
Deduction $127,800 $65,550 $50,766 $- N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Taxable income 
benefit  $127,800 $65,550 $50,766 $255,600 $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 
Taxable income 
benefit  $37,062 $19,010 $14,722 $74,124 $74,124 $38,019 $29,444 $74,124 
Tax Owed $218,538 $112,091 $86,810 $181,476 $181,476 $93,081 $72,088 $181,476 
Net employee 
benefit $30,000 $30,000 $23,234 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $23,234 $30,000 
 At Sale At Sale 
Sale Price $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 
Gain on Shares $66,900 $66,900 $51,812 $66,900 $66,900 $66,900 $51,812 $66,900 
Taxable Gain 
on Shares $33,450 $33,450 $25,906 $33,450 N/A $66,900 $51,812 $66,900 
Tax Owed on 
Gain (Short-
term rate in 
US) $9,701 $9,701 $7,513 $9,701 $19,401 $19,401 $15,025 $19,401 
Total Tax 
Owing $46,763 $28,710 $22,235 $83,825 $93,525 $57,420 $44,470 $93,525 
 Total Net 
Employee 
Benefit $275,738 $169,290 $131,109 $238,676 $228,975 $140,580 $108,875 $228,975 
Canadian 




In Canada, if the options are exercised and sold in the same tax year, then the employee 
income benefit inclusion (and offsetting deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d), if applicable) is 
identical to that described in Example 1.  In addition, the employee realizes a capital gain72 on the 
disposition of the shares, only one-half of which is subject to tax.  In this example, the capital gain 
for all but the reduced share option award is $66,900 [30,000 × ($25.00 – $22.77)], giving rise to a 
taxable capital gain of $33,450.  This amount is taxed at the individual’s marginal tax rate 
(assumed to be twenty-nine percent) for a total tax owing on the capital gain of $9,700.50.  The 
capital gain for the reduced share option award is $51,811.82 for a total tax owing on the taxable 
portion of the gain of $7,512.71.  Because the tax treatment of the capital gain does not vary 
according to the underlying option characteristics, it does not affect the conclusions reached 
regarding the tax benefit of backdated options in Example 1.  The highest after-tax benefit arises 
from the backdated at-the-money options, and the lowest from the fixed-value options granted on 
November 30 based on the $18.40 strike price. 
In the United States, since the executive held the shares for less than a calendar year, the 
individual will again not benefit from ISO treatment.  For all the cases (ignoring the implications of 
I.R.C. § 409A73), the employee benefit is the same as that summarized in Table 1.  In addition, due 
to the sale price of $25.00, the employee realizes a capital gain of $66,900 on the disposition (the 
same amount as in Canada), except that because the employee held the shares for less than a year, 
the capital gain is a short-term capital gain and is subject to tax at the same marginal tax rate as 
other income (assumed to be twenty-nine percent).  
D. Example 4—Vest Over Five Years; Sale More Than One Year After Exercise 
In the fourth example, we extend Example 3 by changing the sale date to be more than one 
year after the exercise date.  The price of the underlying share on the exercise date is still $22.77, 
and the eventual sale price is assumed to be $25, the same as in Example 3.  Table 3 summarizes 
the tax consequence of this example in Canada and the United States. 
                                                   
72
 The gain realized is assumed to be a capital gain rather than an ordinary gain, although this characterization 
may be a matter of some dispute.  See generally Daniel Sandler, The Adventure in Venture Capital: Capital Gains vs. 
Ordinary Income, 42 TAX NOTES INT’L 621 (2006) (discussing the history in the common law system of failing to 
completely distinguish between ordinary income and capital gains). 
73
 As in Example 2, I.R.C. § 409A would radically alter the tax treatment of in-the-money options. 
 Table 3: Summary of Tax Implication from Example 4, Individual Exercises and Sells More Than One Year Later 







Backdated At-the-Money Reduced Share In-the-Money 
 At Exercise At Exercise 
# of Options 30,000 30,000 23,234 30,000 30,000 30,000 23,234 30,000 
Exercise Price $14.25 $18.4 $18.4 $14.25 $14.25 $18.4 $18.4 $14.25 
FMV at 
Exercise $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 $22.77 
Total Income 
Benefit $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 $255,600 $131,100 $101,533 $255,600 
Income Benefit 




Vesting $- $12,367 $- $255,600 $- $12,367 $- $255,600 
Deduction N/A $6,184 N/A N/A  N/A   
Taxable Income 
Benefit at 
Exercise  $6,184  $255,600    $255,600 
Tax Owed at 
Exercise $- $1,793 $- $74,124 $- $3,586 $- $74,124 
US AMT      $71,568 $67,982 $28,429 $- 
 At Sale At Sale 
Sale Price $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 $25 
Gain on Shares $66,900 $66,900 $51,812 $66,900 $322,500 $185,633 $153,344 $66,900 
Taxable Gain 
on Shares $33,450 $33,450 $25,906 $33,450 $322,500 $185,633 $153,344 $66,900 
 167 
 
Tax Owing on 
Gain $9,700.50 $9,701 $7,513 $9,701 $48,375 $27,845 $23,002 $10,035 
Deferred 
Income $255,600 $118,733 $101,533 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Deduction $127,800 $59,366 $50,766 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Taxable Income 
Benefit at Sale $127,800 $59,366 $50,766 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tax Owing on 
Income Benefit $37,062 $17,216 $14,722 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
AMT credit (if 
any)     $38,340 $17,810 $8,495  
 Tax Owed at 
Sale $46,763 $26,917 $22,235 $9,701 $10,035 $10,035 $14,507 $10,035 
Total Tax Paid $46,763 $28,710 $22,235 $83,825 $81,603 $81,603 $42,936 $84,159 
Total Net  
Employee 
Benefit $275,738 $169,290 $131,109 $238,676 $240,897 $116,397 $110,409 $238,341 
Canadian 
advantage (%) 14.46 45.44 18.75 0.14     
 In Canada, as the options are exercised and sold in different years, we now have to 
consider the role of the deferral introduced in 2000, assuming that the options are exercised prior to 
March 4, 2010.74  The amount that may be deferred is limited to the benefit arising on $100,000 
worth of stock options per year of vesting (based on the fair market value of the underlying stock 
when the options were granted).  
In the first scenario—backdated options that are reported as being at-the-money—the 
maximum number of stock options vesting in any one year that can benefit from the deferral is 
7,017, which is calculated by dividing the $100,000 limit by $14.25, the purported fair market 
value of the underlying stock when the options were granted.  Since only 6,000 options vest each 
year, the entire employee benefit arising on the exercise of all 30,000 options is deferred from the 
year that the options are exercised until the year of sale.  Upon the sale of the stock, the individual 
includes the deferred income benefit in his income, claims the fifty percent deduction under 
paragraph 110(1)(d) of the I.T.A.,75 and pays the tax owing on the taxable income benefit in the 
amount of $37,062 and the taxable capital gain of $9,700.50.  The total tax paid is $46,762.50 and 
the net employee benefit is $275,737.50.  The absolute quantum of the benefit is the same as in 
Example 3, not taking into account the time value of money.  In this example, however, since the 
tax on the stock option benefit is deferred until a later year (since the shares are sold in a later 
year), the relative quantum of the benefit is greater than in Example 3. 
If instead, the option had been properly dated as November 30 and had an associated strike 
price of $18.40, then the deferral is calculated using the fair market value at grant of $18.40 rather 
than $14.25.  Consequently, the maximum number of stock options vesting in any one year that can 
benefit from the deferral is 5,434, which is calculated by dividing the $100,000 limit by $18.40. 
Since this number is less than the 6,000 options that vest each year under this plan, not all of the 
stock option benefit arising in the year of exercise can be deferred until the year of sale.  The 
maximum benefit that the individual can defer is $118,732.90 [5 × 5,434 × ($22.77 – $18.40)].  
The individual defers this amount to the year in which the shares are sold, but must include the 
remaining employee benefit ($12,367.10, representing the difference between the total employee 
benefit of $131,100 and the maximum deferral of $118,732.90) in the year of exercise.  In the year 
of exercise, the individual can claim the fifty-percent deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d) of the 
I.T.A.,76 reducing the amount added to taxable income to $6,183.55 with associated tax liability of 
$1,793.23.  Since the stock has not been sold at this time, the executive must pay this tax liability 
from other income; the amount is small enough that this should not be onerous.  Upon the sale of 
the stock, the individual includes the deferred stock option benefit in income, claims the 50% 
deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d) of the I.T.A.,77 and pays the tax owing on the stock option 
benefit in the amount of $17,216.27 and the taxable capital gain of $9,700.50.  The absolute 
quantum of the economic benefit to the employee in this scenario is the same as in Example 3, but 
part of it must be paid at exercise rather than being deferred to the year in which the shares are sold 
(so that, as in the case of the backdated at-the-money options, the relative quantum of the benefit is 
greater than in Example 3). 
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 See I.T.A., s. 7(1.1). 
75
 See I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d). 
76
 See id. 
77
 See id. 
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Under the reduced share option, the outcome is similar to the first scenario in this example, 
with the individual deferring the full stock option benefit until the year of sale.78  
In the case of the in-the-money option award, the individual cannot defer the income 
inclusion beyond the time the options are exercised.  At exercise, the individual must report the full 
income benefit of $255,600 and pay tax amounting to $74,124.  Since the stock has not been sold at 
this time, the executive must pay this much larger tax liability from other income sources.  But 
when the shares are ultimately sold, the individual pays only the tax owing on the capital gain. 
A backdated option does not qualify for the deferral.  If an executive reports a backdated 
option as an at-the-money award, exercises and sells it in different years, and does not report the 
stock option benefit in the exercise year (i.e., the executive claims the deferral), then the individual 
is underpaying taxes in the exercise year by $74,124.  In addition, in the sale year when the stock 
option benefit is recognized, the executive is also improperly reporting the deduction under 
paragraph 110(1)(d).  Thus, employees who receive backdated stock options may be reassessed not 
only to deny any deduction claimed under paragraph 110(1)(d), but also to include the full stock 
option benefit in an earlier year than that in which the employee reported the benefit for tax 
purposes.  Such reassessment would also include interest, compounded daily at a relatively high 
rate.  Furthermore, if the executive knew of the backdating, he or she may be subject to gross 
negligence penalties and could even be charged with tax evasion.79  
In the United States, the significant difference between this example and Example 3 is that, 
in this case, the options meet the holding period requirement for ISO treatment.80  Recall that the 
first scenario involves backdated options with an exercise price of $14.25, purportedly the fair 
market value of the shares at the time of grant.  In that scenario, not only is there no stock option 
benefit in the year of exercise, but also the entire gain (the difference between the ultimate sale 
price of $25 per share and the strike price of $14.25 per share) is a long-term capital gain and is 
subject to tax at the preferential rate of fifteen percent.81  Thus, the only tax obligation faced by the 
individual in the absence of AMT, discussed below, is tax of $48,375 in the year of sale, leaving an 
after-tax benefit to the employee of $274,125, only marginally less than the after-tax benefit in 
Canada. 
The deferral of the benefit from the year the options are exercised is a tax preference for 
AMT purposes.82  For the purposes of computing the U.S. executive’s AMT liability, the amount 
of the stock option benefit in the year the option is exercised, $255,600 (30,000 × [$22.77 – 
$14.25]), is included in the computation of alternative minimum taxable income (“AMTI”).  The 
impact of the AMT is that the U.S. executive’s tax liability is essentially accelerated to the year the 
option is exercised and is subject to AMT at a relatively high rate (26-28%, depending on the 
amount of AMTI).83  For illustration purposes in Table 3, we have assumed that the executive’s 
compensation in addition to the stock option benefit is high enough both to make the AMT rate 
associated with the stock option benefit twenty-eight percent and to eliminate the benefit of the 
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 See I.T.A., s. 7(1.1). 
79
 See supra note 62. 
80
 See I.R.C. §§ 421(a), 422(b) (2006). 
81
 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). 
82
 See supra note 39. See also I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2006). 
83
 See I.R.C. § 55(b) (West 2011). 
 exemption amount for AMT purposes.84  Thus, the tentative minimum tax associated with the 
deferral would be $71,568 (twenty-eight percent of $255,600) although the AMT payable would 
likely be somewhat less.85  As a consequence, the tax payable by the employee in the year of 
exercise is dramatically higher in the United States than in Canada—and will have to be paid from 
other sources of income if the employee wishes to avoid selling any shares acquired in that year.  
The amount of AMT can be carried forward and applied as a credit in subsequent years to the 
extent that the executive’s regular tax liability in that year exceeds the tentative minimum tax for 
that year.86  Assuming there is significant income taxed at the highest marginal rate (assumed to be 
twenty-nine percent), there would be a tax saving each year (i.e., at least the one-percent difference 
between the AMT rate and the regular tax rate).  In the year the shares are sold, the AMT liability 
is computed on the assumption that the cost base of the shares for AMT purposes is $22.77 rather 
than the $14.25 cost assumed for regular tax purposes.  However, because the long-term capital 
gains tax rate of fifteen percent is applicable for both AMT and regular tax purposes, the AMT 
credit available that year will, in effect, be limited to fifteen percent of the benefit included in 
income in the year of exercise rather than the full AMT paid that year.87  Thus, the AMT liability 
in the year of exercise may act as more than an anti-deferral mechanism; it acts as a real cost in this 
case to the extent that the credit cannot be fully utilized by the time the shares are sold.  As 
indicated in Table 3, the Canadian executive enjoys a net employee benefit of almost $35,000, or 
14.5% more than the U.S. executive.88   
In the second scenario in the United States, only 5,434 options per year of vesting qualify 
for ISO treatment.89  Since this is less than the 6,000 options that vest each year under this plan, the 
excess options (566 per year) are treated as NSOs, with the stock option benefit on these options 
subject to tax in the year of exercise.90  Consequently, in the year of exercise, the stock option 
benefit on 27,170 exercised options will be deferred until the year in which the shares are sold for 
regular income tax purposes, with the balance91 subject to tax in the year of exercise.92  Subject to 
AMT, the result is similar to that in Canada, except that there is no equivalent to the deduction 
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 See I.R.C. § 55(d) (West 2011).  Assuming that the individual is married and files a joint return, the AMTI 
must be at least $330,000 to eliminate the exemption amount. 
85
 In our example, if the executive’s effective marginal tax rate of twenty-nine percent applies to a sufficient 
portion of the taxpayer’s income (for regular income tax purposes), then the AMT payable would be approximately one 
percent less than $71,568 (and, as the income subject to a marginal tax rate exceeding twenty-eight percent increases, the 
amount of AMT decreases).  Because of the various factors that can affect AMT, we have assumed for illustration 
purposes in Table 3 that AMT is equal to the tentative minimum tax payable.  See supra note 39. 
86
 See I.R.C. § 53(b) (2006). 
87
 See I.R.C. § 55(b) (West 2011).  Assuming that the executive’s compensation in addition to the stock option 
benefit is high enough to make the AMT rate twenty-eight percent (on income other than the long-term capital gain) and 
to eliminate the benefit of the exemption amount, the AMT payable on the long-term capital gain will be $10,035 [15% 
× 30,000 × ($25 – $22.77)] compared to the regular tax of $48,375, so that $38,340 of the AMT credit carried over 
from the year of exercise could be applied to the extent that it has not been previously used.  In other words, 
approximately 53.5% (far less than all) of the AMT credit carried over from the year the options were exercised could be 
applied in the year of sale to reduce the regular tax otherwise owing that year.  See I.R.C. § 55 (West 2011); I.R.C. § 56 
(2006). 
88
 See supra Table 3. 
89
 See I.R.C. §§ 421(a), 422(a)-(b) (2006). 
90
 See I.R.C. § 83 (2006). 
91
 In this scenario, the benefit on 2,830 options. 
92
 See I.R.C. §§ 421(a), 422(d) (2006). 
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under paragraph 110(1)(d) of the I.T.A., so that the entire $12,367.10 is subject to tax in the year of 
exercise at the employee’s marginal tax rate.93  For AMT purposes, however, the entire stock 
option benefit (including the 5,434 options that qualify for ISO treatment) is included in income in 
the year of exercise, dramatically increasing the tax liability in that year. 94   Thus, for AMT 
purposes, the tentative minimum tax payable would be the same as in the first scenario.95   
In the year of sale in the second scenario, the deferred stock option benefit will form part of 
the long-term capital gain realized by the employee, so that for regular income tax purposes the 
employee benefits not only from a deferral of this income inclusion, but also from the application 
of the long-term capital gains tax rate of fifteen percent.96  The $185,632.90 long-term capital gain 
in the year of sale is made up of $179,32297 plus $6,310.90.98  This amount is subject to tax at the 
rate of fifteen percent, for a tax liability of $27,845.99  As in the first scenario, the AMT liability in 
the year the shares are sold is computed on the assumption that the cost base of the shares for AMT 
purposes is $22.77 rather than the $14.25 cost assumed for regular tax purposes.100  Assuming that 
the executive’s compensation in addition to the stock option benefit is high enough for an AMT 
rate of twenty-eight percent to apply on income other than the long-term capital gain, and is high 
enough for the benefit of the exemption amount to be eliminated, the AMT payable on the long-
term capital gain will be $10,035,101 compared to the regular tax of $27,845.  Therefore, $17,810 
of the AMT credit carried over from the year of exercise could be applied to the extent that it has 
not been previously used.102  Due to the significant AMT liability in the year of exercise, which is 
only partially creditable in the year of sale, the U.S. executive is in a substantially worse position 
than the Canadian executive.103  
Under the reduced share option scenario in the United States, the regular income tax 
treatment in the year of exercise is similar to that in the first scenario, with the individual deferring 
the full stock option benefit until the year of sale.  However, for AMT purposes, the entire stock 
option benefit is included in AMTI. 104   Based on the same assumptions as in the preceding 
scenarios, the AMT liability would be $28,429 in the year of exercise.105  In the year of sale, the 
regular tax liability would be $23,002 compared to an AMT liability of $14,507, so that an AMT 
                                                   
93
 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 55(b) (West 2011); I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2006). 
94
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
95
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (the AMT payable will be somewhat less than the tentative 
minimum tax payable); see also supra Table 3 (for illustrative purposes, the AMT is assumed to be the difference 
between $71,568 tentative minimum tax payable and the $3,586 regular tax payable on the 2,830 options).   
96
 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). 
97
 The gain realized on the 27,170 (5 × 5,434) ISOs, calculated as [27,170 × ($25 – $18.40)].  See I.R.C. 
§ 421(a) (2006).  
98
 The gain realized on the 2,830 (5 × 566) NSOs, calculated as [2,830 × ($25 – $22.77)].  See I.R.C. § 83(a) 
(2006).  
99
 See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).  
100
 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2006). 
101
 15% × 30,000 × ($25 – $22.77) = $10,035.  See I.R.C. §§ 55(b), (d) (West 2011). 
102
 See I.R.C. § 53(a) (2006). 
103
 See supra Table 3 (the Canadian executive enjoys a net employee benefit of almost $53,000, or 45.4% more 
than the American executive in this scenario).  
104
 I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2006).  
105
 See supra pp. 158-59 (discussing the assumptions behind the preceding examples). 
 credit of $8,495 could be applied to reduce the tax liability to $14,507.106  Again, the resulting 
after-tax benefit to the employee is significantly less than that in Canada.107 
Finally, the in-the-money option scenario does not benefit from ISO treatment, so the 
entire stock option benefit is subject to tax in the year of exercise at the employee’s marginal tax 
rate (and therefore no AMT will be payable).108  However, the gain realized on the ultimate sale of 
the shares is a long-term capital gain that is taxed at the fifteen percent preferential rate.109  The 
after-tax benefit to the U.S. employee in this one scenario is only marginally less than that in 
Canada.110 
The fourth example demonstrates that the potential impact of the AMT can more than 
offset the preference for ISOs in the United States so that only in relatively few circumstances111 is 
an American executive in a similar (or perhaps better) position than a Canadian executive.  This 
example also highlights another phenomenon, not explored in this paper, of “exercise 
backdating.”112  For U.S. executives, exercise backdating could mean the difference between ISO 
treatment and NSO treatment (but in the year the stock was sold, as it would be a disqualified 
disposition of ISOs) for up to $100,000 worth of options per vesting year. 113   For Canadian 
executives, exercise backdating is unlikely to occur because there is no holding period requirement 
in Canada in order to benefit from the preferential treatment in paragraph 110(1)(d).114  In fact, 
exercise backdating would only result in an increased after-tax benefit when the employee is not 
entitled to a deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d). 115   Exercise backdating is thus likely a 
phenomenon limited to the United States. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this paper was to highlight the significant effect of personal income taxes on 
the after-tax returns to backdated options held by Canadian executives relative to U.S. executives. 
Indeed, as the examples in the previous section indicate, Canadian executives by and large are 
financially better off than their U.S. counterparts from employee stock options in all cases.116  This 
holds true even for options that benefit from ISO treatment in the United States, due to the 
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 See supra Table 3. 
107
 The Canadian executive realizes $20,700 after tax, or 18.75% more than the U.S. executive.  See id. 
108
 See I.R.C. §§ 83, 421(a), 422(b) (2006). 
109
 See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006).  
110
 See Emmanuel Saez & Michael Veall, The Evolution of High Incomes in Northern America: Lessons from 
Canadian Evidence, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 831, 837, 845 (2005) (in fact, the after-tax benefit in this scenario could be 
higher in the United States than in Canada because the marginal tax rate faced by most executives in Canada is 
significantly higher than twenty-nine percent so that even though only one-half of the stock option benefit and one-half of 
the capital gain are included in income, the effective rate of tax on the benefit would likely exceed fifteen percent). 
111
 In the case of in-the-money options (the fourth scenario) as well as in situations where the executive has a 
sufficiently large amount of non-stock option income to eliminate or minimize the impact of AMT. 
112
 Dan Dhaliwal et al., Taxes and the Backdating of Stock Option Exercise Dates, 47 J. ACCT. & ECON. 27, 27-
29 (2009) (describing “exercise backdating” as the practice of reporting the exercise of stock options at an earlier time, 
and perhaps lower price, than the actual exercise date of the options). 
113
 See I.R.C. §§ 83(a), 421(a), 422 (2006). 
114
 See I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d). 
115
 In the case of in-the-money options (as distinct from backdated at-the-money options), which are almost 
never purposefully granted to Canadian executives in any event due to stock exchange restrictions.  See supra note 5. 
116
 See supra Part III (as illustrated in examples). 
 173 
 
application of AMT.117  This analysis also shows that personal income tax may have played a role 
in executives’ willingness to accept backdated options in Canada but not in the United States.118 
Our results raise an important policy question as to why executive stock options are treated 
in Canada essentially as an investment rather than as compensation,119 even when the options are 
exercised and sold at the same time.  Perhaps it is time for Canada to rethink this deduction, either 
to eliminate it completely or to attach a holding period requirement similar to that in the United 
States.120  
Finally, the discussion above indicates that there is a need to empirically investigate the 
incidence of backdating among Canadian companies.  No comprehensive study has been done on 
the extent to which backdating exists in Canada, as has been done in the United States.  Is 
backdating a widespread problem in Canadian financial markets or is it limited to only a handful of 
companies?  Similarly, no comprehensive study has been done to determine if backdated stock 
options have been supplanted by an alternative incentive award, such as restricted stock units 
(whether manipulated or not) or another nefarious pricing behavior such as the opportunistic timing 
of stock option repricing.121  This investigation is necessary to inform policymakers of whether 
their existing efforts to combat option backdating have been successful, and whether they need to 
shift gears toward targeting more contemporary forms of fraudulent compensation practice.  With 
respect to tax policy, another angle worth considering is how various changes to the Canadian 
I.T.A. may have impacted the extent of backdating.122  Finally, investigating backdating in Canada 
will provide results that will be useful not only for those in Canada, but also to inform those 
interested in examining backdating in the United States.   
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 See I.R.C. § 55 (West 2011). 
118
 See generally Ryan A. Compton et al., Backdating, Tax Evasion, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Canadian Tax Reform, 59 TAX NOTES INT’L 671 (2010) (discussing the link between Canadian tax reform and stock 
option backdating). 
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 See I.T.A., s. 110(1)(d). 
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 See Sandler, supra note 24, at 270-71 (suggesting such a rethinking back in 2001).  See also LIBERAL PARTY 
OF CANADA, YOUR FAMILY. YOUR FUTURE. YOUR CANADA. 1, 11 (2011), available at 
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taxpayers are claiming much more modest amounts.  But those 8,000 high earners are receiving three-quarters of the total 
claimed under the stock option deduction . . . .  The change will . . . return approximately $600 million to the public purse 
over two years.”). 
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 Such pricing behavior could take place as a result of responses by policymakers in Canada and the United 
States to concerns about backdated stock options. 
122
 For example, there may be increased evidence of backdating following the introduction in 1984 of 
paragraph 110(1)(d) or the extension of the deferral of the stock option benefit in 2000 to public company employees. 
 APPENDIX 
A key driver behind this paper is to isolate the role taxes may play in the returns from 
backdating and their influence on the decision by an executive to accept a backdated stock option 
in lieu of some other form of compensation (options or otherwise) as well as her decision to report 
a backdated option for tax purposes.  To further clarify beyond the main text, consider the factors 
that determine the monetary return from a stock option for a single share that has been exercised 
and then subsequently sold (V) at the same time or later in the same tax year:123 
V = (PE – Px)(1 – τy) + (PS – PE)(1 – τg)        (1) 
where PE represents the price of the underlying share at option exercise, PX  is the option 
exercise price, τy is the tax rate on the income benefit associated with the option exercise, PS is the price of the stock once finally sold, and τg is the tax on any gains arising over the period the share 
was acquired and then eventually sold. 
Equation (1) is essentially composed of two parts: (a) the income benefit accrued when the 
option is exercised (assuming that the exercise price is less than the existing market price), which is 
taxed at rate τy; and (b) the capital gain realized from the time the options are exercised to the time the acquired stock is sold, which is taxed at rate τg.  In the case where the option is exercised and 
sold on the same day, the gain is zero since PS = PE. 
PX represents the exercise price associated with a given executive stock option.  However, 
in the context of backdating, it is important to deconstruct PX into two components: (a) the true 
price of the underlying stock at the time the executive stock option is granted (PT); and (b) the discount due to backdating (δ). 
PX = PT – δ      (2) 
This allows us to see clearly that in the case of no backdating, δ = 0 and therefore PX = PT; 
the exercise price associated with the grant is equal to the true price of the underlying share at the 
time the options were granted.  This is referred to as a “currently priced option.”  In the case of δ > 
0, the exercise price for the grant is lower than the actual share price at the time of the grant 
because PX < PT.  If it is claimed that the option was granted when the price was trading at PX, then 
we have a “backdated option.”  To account for this information, we can restate equation (1) as 
follows: 
V = (PE – PT + δ)(1 – τy) + (PS – PE)(1 – τg)        (3) 
Our interest lies in demonstrating three factors that affect the returns from a stock option 
(once it is exercised and the underlying stock is then sold): τy, τg, and δ.  Taking the derivative of 
(3) with respect to these three variables in turn yields the following: 𝜕𝑉𝜕δ = (1-τy) > 0      (4)   
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 This restriction eliminates the possibility of ISOs.  The focus of this article is to understand the influence of 
taxes on backdating in Canada, and Canada does not have the equivalent of an ISO. 
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𝜕𝑉𝜕𝜏𝑔 = −(𝑃𝑆 − 𝑃𝐸) < 0           (5) 
       
𝜕𝑉𝜕𝜏𝑦 = –(PE – PT + δ) < 0           (6) 
 
Equation (4) demonstrates that, assuming τy < 1 (i.e., the tax rate is less than one hundred 
percent), returns increase the larger the discount of the exercise price relative to the actual trading 
price on the day the option was granted (i.e., the more the option exercise price was backdated).  
This of course is the general principle behind backdating: lower the exercise price relative to the 
trading price at the time of grant to gain a higher return, and so this positive relationship between δ 
and V is fully expected.  It shows that a backdated option will be preferred to a currently dated 
option. 
Our focus, however, lies on the role taxes may play in determining the demand for a 
backdated option.  There are two tax rates to consider: first, the tax related to the gain, and second, 
the tax related to the income benefit.  In Equation (5) we see a negative relationship between tax 
(τg) and returns to the executive, where τg represents the tax on capital gains accruing after 
exercising the option and holding the stock until sale.  It is evident that this portion of the return is 
unrelated to the backdating discount, and so requires no further elaboration in the context of 
backdating. 
Equation (6) is the equation of most interest in terms of the potential relationship between 
tax and the benefit from backdating.  Equation (6) demonstrates that a negative relationship exists 
between τy and V; the lower the tax on income received through exercising an option grant, the 
higher the return.  As discussed in the main text, however, in Canada different effective tax rates 
apply to the income benefit based on the reported presence of δ, whereas in the United States the 
same tax rate applies regardless.  The effective rate of taxation with respect to the income benefit 
from stock options is higher in the United States than in Canada, as Canadians can claim a 
deduction equal to fifty percent of the income inclusion.  But this reduced rate only applies if δ = 0, 
or the option is reported as such. 124   That is, Equation (3) applies to the pre-I.R.C. § 409A 
environment in the United States whereas the situation in Canada is better represented as follows: 
V = I[δ ≤ 0](PE – PT + δ)(1 – τy0) + I[δ > 0](PE – PT + δ)(1 – τy1) + (PS – PE)(1 – τg)     (7) 
where I[·] is an indicator function that takes the value of one when the statement in the 
square brackets is true and zero when it is false.  The relevant part of the value of the income 
benefit is then triggered by the indicator function for whether the option is discounted or not, as 
this can result in tax differences (τy0 vs. τy1) which can provide the tax incentive for an individual 
who receives a backdated option in Canada to report it as though it were not. 
It follows that the Canadian regime, where τy0 < τy1, rewards backdating125—or, more 
correctly, rewards backdating if the strike price reported for tax purpose is PX and not PT.  In terms 
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 See I.T.A., s. 7, 110(1)(d). 
125
 The executive earns a higher after-tax return from a misreported backdated option in Canada than in the 
United States. 
 of the decision to accept a backdated versus an in-the-money option, until recently in the United 
States an executive would be indifferent between the two options126 whereas a Canadian executive 
would not be indifferent.127  As a result of the lower tax rate in Canada on the income benefit of 
the option, a Canadian executive is able to “capture” a greater amount of the backdated return than 
the U.S. executive.  
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 The tax rate on the two would be identical. 
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 Canadian executives would prefer a misreported backdated option with the available income tax deduction, 
effectively lowering their tax rate, which is not available for an in-the-money option. 
